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TOLL BRIDGE REGULATION: A METHOD
OF MASS TRANSIT FINANCING AND AIR
QUALITY CONTROL
GERALD M. TIERNE Y*
The practice of charging tolls on bridges began before the reign of
Charlemagne.' As the era of private enterprise flourished in Great
Britain and the United States, tolls for travelling on roads and
bridges became the rule rather than the exception.2 At one time al-
most all the bridges in Great Britain charged tolls for passage,3 and
many well-known bridges in the United States, built with private
financing, charged tolls to provide a fair return on the construction
investment.4
* Trial Attorney, Federal Highway Administration. B.A., Fordham University,
1969; J.D., Syracuse University, College of Law, 1972; LL.M., University of Mis-
souri-Kansas City School of Law, 1974. The opinions and conclusions expressed in
this article are those of the author and do not represent the official position of the
Federal Highway Administration.
1. W. WATSON & S. WATSON, BRIDGES IN HISTORY AND LEGEND (1937) [herein-
after cited as WATSON].
2. See generally M. SEARLE, TURNPIKE AND TOLL-BARS (1937) [hereinafter cited
as SEARLE]; F. WOOD, THE TURNPIKES OF NEW ENGLAND (1919).
3. 1 SEARLE, s.upra note 2, at 62-68.
4. WATSON, supra note 1, at 175-76. The Brooklyn Bridge, for example, was orig-
inally constructed as a private enterprise although it was later taken over by the sepa-
rate cities of New York and Brooklyn. The following tolls were in effect in 1885.
Each foot passenger I€
Each rail passenger 3¢
One horse and one man 3¢
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Increased mobility, spurred by the development of a new means of
transportation, brought natural opposition to paying tolls for crossing
bridges or using roads. Throughout the United States many people
fought for legislation to free the toll facilities.' In response to this
demand,6 local and federal governmental policy began to view road-
ways not as private property but as facilities that should be open to
the general public.!
With regard to bridges, Congress moved at a slightly different
pace,8 although a free bridge policy eventually prevailed. Both
before and after the General Bridge Act of 19069 public and private
bridges were permitted to charge tolls, limited only by the require-
ment that the charge remain "reasonable and just."'0 Later, in grant-
ing approval for the construction of each new bridge, Congress added
the restriction that tolls could not exceed an amount necessary to re-
pay the cost of construction.'" The General Bridge Act of 194612 lim-
ited this "no-profit" restriction to publicly-owned bridges, while
One horse and one vehicle 5¢
Two horses and one vehicle 10¢
Each additional horse 3;
Neat cattle 5C
Sheeps and hogs 2C
Id
5. 2 SEARLE, supra note 2, at 631-62.
6. See U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSPORTATION, FEDERAL HIGHWAY ADMINISTRATION,
A HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL AID PROGRAM 14, 16 & 253 (1976) [hereinafter cited as
AMERICA'S HIGHWAYS].
7. Congressional sanction of such policy is clearly stated in the Federal-Aid High-
way Act: "Except as provided in section 129 of this title with respect to certain toll
bridges and toll tunnels, all highways constructed under the provisions of this title
shall be free from tolls of all kinds." 23 U.S.C. § 301 (1970).
8. Congress derives its power to regulate bridges from the Commerce Clause, U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. Congressional regulation of bridges was upheld in Gilman v.
Philadelphia, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 713 (1865).
9. 33 U.S.C. §§ 491-498 (1970).
10. Id at § 494. See discussion of "reasonable and just" toll rates at notes 79 to
89 and accompanying text infra. Many bridges were sponsored by stock promotion
projects. For example, in 1928 Congress granted 75 franchises for private toll bridges.
AMERICA'S HIGHWAYS, supra note 6, at 116.
11. The 1906 Act provided a mechanism for granting permits for construction but
left it to Congress to approve each particular bridge on an individual basis. 33 U.S.C.
§ 491 (1970). It was not until the 1946 Act that Congress gave blanket approval to
bridges as long as the permit was acquired in the prescribed manner. 33 U.S.C. § 525
(1970).
12. 33 U.S.C. §§ 525-533 (1970).
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privately-owned structures remained subject only to the "reasonable
and just" standard.' 3
I. HISTORY OF REGULATION
The proliferation of private bridges within the public road net-
work, on which the nation's commerce depended, prompted Con-
gress to enact the General Bridge Act of 1906.' 4 One of the primary
purposes of this legislation was to protect the public from exorbitant
charges being levied by private bridge owners. By establishing fed-
eral controls, Congress reacted to a contemporaneous Supreme Court
decision, Covington & Burlington Turnpike Road Company v. Sand-
ford, 6 which addressed the reasonableness of toll charges. In Cov-
ington, the Court upheld a state statute that reduced the toll rate
charged by a state-created private turnpike corporation, in effect
drastically reducing the ratemaking ability of the private operators.
Although the original legislation was directed toward private
bridge owners, the same restrictions were often applied to publicly-
owned bridges as well. For example, Congress authorized the con-
struction of four interstate bridges for New York City, to be built by
the New York Port Authority,' 7 but conditioned its approval by mak-
13. Id at §§ 526, 529 (1970).
14. 33 U.S.C. §§ 491-498 (1970). See notes 44-46 and accompanying text infra.
15. H.R. REP. No. 182, 59th Cong., 1st Sess, 2 (1906). See generally 40 CONG.
REC. 1602-03, 1656, 1715-20 (1906). Several Congressmen evinced concern about
high tolls levied by bridge owners. Mr. Clark, of Missouri, noted that it cost more to
transport coal across the St. Louis-East St. Louis Bridge than it cost to transport the
coal from central Illinois to St. Louis. The 1906 Act authorizes the Secretary of War
to fix the rates of tolls and grants bridge owners the right to change those tolls. Con-
gress insured against bridge owners abusing this right by authorizing the Secretary of
War to bring a mandamus or injunctive action against the owner. Additionally, the
Secretary could levy prescribed fines against the owner if the owner violated the Act.
The Interstate Commerce and Foreign Trade Committee, which sponsored the bill,
intended to levy an onerous but not unbearable fine on owners for violating the Act.
Congressional approval, in the form of a special bill, was required prior to the con-
struction of a bridge over interstate waters. A second purpose of the bill, in addition
to protecting travelers against exorbitant tolls, was to minimize the time Congress
spent considering each special bill. Previously, lengthy passages in each bill required
extended debate and occupied a large part of the statutes. Under the 1906 Act, Con-
gress could quickly pass a relatively short bill of a prescribed form. The new short
form provided the further advantage of insuring uniform legislation.
16. 164 U.S. 578 (1889) (a court, in determining whether a toll is unreasonable or
unjust, must consider the facts of each case. Factors the court weighs are the interests
of the owner and the public and construction and maintenance costs).
17. N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAWS §§ 6401-6423 (65 McKinney's 1961) (created the New
1979]
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ing each bridge subject to the restrictions of the 1906 Act.'8 Thus, for
a short period of time, federal rate control extended theoretically to
many bridges. In the 1946 Act, however, Congress returned to distin-
guishing between publicly and privately-owned bridges, establishing
separate standards for determining tolls on public and private
bridges.19
A. Importance of Toll Regulation
With overcrowded urban roadways, decreasing energy resources,
and increasing pollution problems during the last ten years, the pen-
dulum has swung away from the free road and bridge policy. Con-
trol of traffic flow has frequently been suggested as a means of
addressing such problems."z Implementation of another possible so-
lution, the urban mass transit system, has been hampered by a need
for large capital outlays and by high operating expenses.2 ' Although
federal programs provide some financial support for mass transit sys-
York Port Authority for the purpose of improving co-ordination of commerce facili-
ties in the port of New York City and facilitating the cooperation of New York and
New Jersey to encourage financial investment in future commercial developments).
18. See Act of August 23, 1921, ch. 77, at 174; and Act of March 2, 1925, Pub. L.
No. 520-22, 43 Stat. 389-91. The Act of March 2, 1925 specifies the dates for com-
mencement and completion of four bridges between New York and New Jersey. The
Act also specifies the sites of the bridges and provides that the bridges are to be oper-
ated in accordance with the General Bridge Act of 1906. Id
19. 33 U.S.C. §§ 526, 529 (1970): The Secretary of War was authorized to pre-
scribe reasonable tolls for privately-owned bridges, determined by the "reasonable
and just" standard. Tolls for government-owned bridges were set according to the
goal of providing an amortization fund for the construction, operation, and mainte-
nance of the bridge. After the fund is established tolls are to terminate.
20. Planning guidelines jointly issued by the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency and the U.S. Department of Transportation for the attainment of air quality
standards under the Clean Air Act require the planning agency to analyze certain
traffic control measures. 42 U.S.C.A. § 7408(e) (1977). The guidelines suggest the
following traffic control measures: private car restrictions, road pricing to discourage
single occupancy auto trips, controls on extended vehicle idling, and traffic flow im-
provements. U.S. ENVT'L PROTECTION AGENCY & U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., TRANS-
PORTATION AIR QUALITY PLANNING GUIDELINES (1978).
21. The total operating assistance provided for public transit operators by local,
state, and federal assistance programs has risen from $1,407.8 million in 1975 to
$1,904.1 million in 1977. Total transit expenses increased from $2,241.6 million to
$2,304.8 million in the years 1972 to 1977. AMERICAN PUBLIC TRANSIT ASSN,
TRANSIT FACT BOOK, tables 3, 4 (1978). The average cost of a motor bus increased
from $40,522 to $69,921 between 1972 and 1976. AMERICAN PUBLIC TRANSIT ASSN,
UNITED STATES TRANSIT Industry Market Forecast (1977).
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tems, funds are limited and frequently require matching amounts
from local sources.22 Financing the construction of a mass transit
system is beyond the reach of most urban centers, many of which
have already been forced to cut back on services to maintain sol-
vency.23 Therefore, new financial resources must be developed if
mass transit systems are to be a viable method of solving urban trans-
portation problems.
Bridge tolls are one possible solution for many of the financing
barriers. Tolls may be used to subsidize mass transit operations.
They may be manipulated to encourage or discourage use of bridges,
and thus are an attractive method of managing or reducing traffic
congestion and heavy accumulation of vehicle emissions. The possi-
bility of using tolls in this manner, however, is restricted by two types
of regulation. One type concerns the diversion of toll revenue from
direct support of bridges to support of governmental services such as
police and fire departments, and mass transit systems. The other type
includes restrictions in the Federal-Air Highway Act24 that conflict
with Clear Air Act 5 requirements. Future developments under both
of the General Bridge Acts and the Federal-Aid Highway Act are
likely to involve issues arising under both of these regulations. This
Article will explain how these issues arose and predict what effect
judicially advanced policies will have on the use of publicly-owned
bridges for either mass transit support or as mechanisms for ensuring
compliance with standards set forth in the Clean Air Act.
22. See, e.g., 49 U.S.C.A. §§ 1601-1614 (West Supp. 1977) (federal financial
assistance to reimburse state and local governments for operating expenses and to
correct deferred maintenance cannot exceed the funds provided by the grantee. Id at
§ 1614 (d)).
23. See Muller, Service Costs in the Declining City in Subcomm. on the City of
the House Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
How Cities Can Grow Gracefully 119 (1977).
24. 23 U.S.C.A. §§ 101-136 (West Supp. 1978). For a background and discussion
of the Federal-Aid Highways Act, see Schwartz, Urban Freeways and the Interstate
System, 8 TRANSP. L.J. 167 (1976).
25. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7401-7642 (West Supp. 1978). For a background of the Clean
Air Act Amendments of 1970, see Kramer, Economics Technology and the Clean Air
Act Amendments of 1970: The First Six Years, 6 ECOLOGY L.Q. 161 (1976). For a
discussion of the impact of the Clean Air Act on transportation see Bracken, Trans-
portation Controls Under the Clean Air Act: A LegalAnalysis, 15 B.C. IND. & COM. L.
REV. 749 (1973); Marcus, Clean Air in Search of a Comprehensive National Plan: An
Urban View, 8 URB. LAW. 307 (1976).
1979]
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B. Regulation Under the General Bridge Acts
The Federal Highway Administration (FHWA)z6 has adopted uni-
form procedures for determining whether toll rates for the seventy-
two bridges subject to FHWA control 7 are "reasonable and just."-2 1
These procedures allow the bridge owner to increase rates without
prior federal approval. Only if a complaint about a toll is received,
or if the Administrator decides to look into the matter on his own
motion, is a proceeding commenced.29 At that point all public com-
plaints are transmitted to the bridge owner, who is required to submit
detailed answers-with an explanation of why the tolls should be con-
sidered reasonable.3" At the same time, an investigation team ap-
pointed by the Administrator issues interrogatories and prepares a
report, recommending whether the Administrator should take any
further action.3 After reviewing the recommendation, the Adminis-
26. 49 U.S.C.A. § 1652(e)(1) (West 1976) (creating the FHWA).
27. U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSPORTATION, A STUDY OF FEDERAL STATUTES AND
REGULATIONS GOVERNING TOLL BRIDGES (TOLL STUDY) app. 2, at 5-6 (1974) [here-
inafter cited as TOLL STUDY]. Many bridges are not subject to FHWA regulations.
For example, bridges built under the authority of state legislatures across rivers the
navigable portions of which lie wholly within a state and bridges built prior to 1946
are among those excepted from regulation. 33 U.S.C. §§ 503, 530. As a result, cities
with many bridges often have a mixture of federally regulated and non-regulated
bridges.
All bridges owned by the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey are covered
by federal regulations. These are the Bayonne, George Washington and Goethals
bridges and the Outerbridge Crossing. Other toll bridges in and around New York
City are free from federal regulations. The FHWA regulates tolls on the San Fran-
cisco-Oakland Bay Bridge but not on the Golden Gate Bridge which is subject to state
control.
28. 49 C.F.R. § 310 (1977). The Federal Highway Administrator (1) determines
whether there are sufficient grounds to initiate adjudication proceedings on the ques-
tion of the reasonableness of a toll; (2) determines whether a toll rate is "reasonable
and just"; and (3) prescribes the toll rates if he determines that existing rates are
unreasonable and unjust. Id at Subpost A.
29. 49 C.F.R. § 310 (1977). "Any person" may file a written complaint with the
Administrator. A brief statement of the nature of the complainant's interest in the
"reasonableness and justness" of tolls; the reasons the complainant feels the tools are
"unreasonable and unjust"; and a statement of any prior action the complainant has
taken to obtain a change in tolls are among the required provisions of a complaint.
30. 49 C.F.R. § 310.4 (1977). The respondent, defined as the person or agency
responsible for establishing or collecting a toll, must file a written response with the
Administrator within 30 days after the respondent receives the complaint. The an-
swer should contain detailed statements of toll revenues and information about the
intended and prior disposition of toll revenues. Id
31. 44 C.F.R. § 310.5 (1977). The Administrator may conduct the investigation
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trator either orders a hearing or makes a decision on the data as sub-
mitted.32 Once a toll decision is reached, that rate remains in effect
for the term of the order33 unless a petition for modification is sub-
mitted.34
One of the most important elements of the entire process is the
requirement of a formal Administrative Procedure Act (APA)35 hear-
ing if the Administrator finds there are factual issues in dispute.3 6
Without the APA hearing, most decisions of the Administrator would
be subject to de novo review in the courts, thereby greatly increasing
himself or he may appoint representatives of the Administrator to direct a formal
adjudicatory proceeding; those representatives may participate as representatives of
the public interest. The investigation is to be concluded within 90 days after the Ad-
ministrator receives a response from the respondent. That deadline may be extended
45 days to allow the complainant to respond to inquiries made by the investigators if
the investigators request the information within 60 days after the Administrator re-
ceived the respondent's answer to the complaint. Id
32. 49 C.F.R. § 310.7 (1977). Within 30 days after the conclusion of the investiga-
tion the Administrator determines whether there are sufficient grounds for an adjudi-
cation. After the termination of the investigation the Administrator may hold
informal conferences with the complainant or respondent to simplify or resolve the
issues. If such a conference is held, the Administrator must make his determination
within 30 days after he receives the transcript of the last informal conference. Id at
§§ 310.6, 310.7.
33. 49 C.F.R. § 310.16 (1977). An order setting the "reasonable" rates cannot be
for less than two or more than three years in duration. When the order terminates the
bridge owner is free to raise the rates. If someone complains about the new rates the
entire procedure for reviewing the reasonableness of the rates begins anew. Id.
34. 49 C.F.R. § 310.4a (1977). A respondent may petition for modification of the
Administrator's order setting new toll rates. The respondent must publish a notice of
the petition to modify that includes a proposed toll rate. When he receives the peti-
tion the Administrator publishes a notice in the Federal Register. The administrator
will not consider a petition to modify an order for at least six months after the order
was issued, unless the order specifically provides otherwise. Unless the Administrator
orders otherwise or additional complaints are submitted under § 310.3, the toll rate
proposed by the respondent will take effect 10 days after notice publication in the
Federal Register. If a complaint is received or if the proposed toll rate is stayed, the
Administrator investigates and determines the petition for modification in accordance
with the other provisions of the regulation. Id.
35. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 556 (1970) (provides for administra-
tive hearings by a government agency to decide issues of fact arising between parties).
36. See Citizens for Allegan County, Inc. v. FPC, 414 F.2d 1125 (D.C. Cir. 1969)
(a citizen's group was entitled to have a meaningful opportunity for hearing in order
to oppose an electric company's acquisition of their city's power plant and for the
transfer to the company of a dam and power house license). See, e.g., United States
v. Consolidated Mines and Smelting Co., 455 F.2d 432 (9th Cir. 1971) (where no facts
are at issue there should be no adversary hearing even though the statute so provides).
19791
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the amount of time necessary to reach a decision and decreasing the
influence the Administrator's expertise would play in the decision-
making process.
Although the Administrator's authority involves a ratemaking
function, it is not the type of ratemaking that can be handled through
rulemaking on an industry-wide or area-wide basis.37 Rather, even
though the authority to set rates is primarily legislative in character,
the type of proceeding at which the reasonableness of the rate is de-
termined is actually quasi-judicial.37a This was first determined by
the Supreme Court in Interstate Commerce Commission v. Louisville &
Nashville Rail-Road Company," many years prior to the adoption of
the APA. The case involved an analogous Interstate Commerce
Commission (ICC) ratemaking proceeding in which railroad class
and commodity rates were reviewed by the ICC upon receipt of com-
plaints. The Court found such proceedings quasi-judicial in nature
and determined that all parties had the right to fully appraise the
evidence submitted, cross-examine witnesses, inspect documents, and
offer evidence in explanation or rebuttal.39 More recent cases have
reinforced the full hearing requirement when the question of reason-
ableness of an individual rate is examined.4 °
37. See United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Steel, 406 U.S. 742 (1972) (ICC rule
regulating the movement of railway cars was found constitutional because reasonably
based on the Esch Car Service Act of 1917, 49 U.S.C. § 1(14) (1970)); Permian Basin
Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747 (1968) (area maximum rates for natural gas were held
to be constitutional due to their conformity with the Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 717d(a) (1970)).
37a. The recent decision of the Court of Appeals in Automobile Club of New York
v. Cox, No. 78-6054 (2d Cir. Jan. 12, 1979) decided that for the purpose of standard of
review toll rate proceedings should be treated as rulemaking actions. Slip op. at 10,
11. The accuracy of such a finding is questionable because it is contrary to a number
of Supreme Court decisions. See note 40 infra.
38. 227 U.S. 88 (1913) (New Orleans Board of Trade brought three separate pro-
ceedings against defendant asking the Commission to set aside as unreasonable and
discriminatory certain class and commodity rates on local and thoroughfare routes).
39. Id. at 97.
40. See United States v. Florida East Coast Ry. Co., 410 U.S. 224 (1973) (citing
Louisville & Nashville to distinguish an adjudicatory proceeding from quasi-legisla-
tive action); Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Pub. Utilities Comm'n, 301 U.S. 292; 300 (1937)
(denial by Commission of company's request to analyze, explain and rebut evidence
used to order a refund of rates previously collected, held to deny company's right to a
fair hearing essential to due process); Morgan v. United States, 298 U.S. 468, 479-80
(1936) (requiring a full hearing when Secretary of Agriculture fixes rates of market
agencies); Clarksburg-Columbus Short Route Bridge Co. v. Woodring, 89 F.2d 788
(D.C. Cir. 1937), rev'd and remandedfor dismissalas moot, 302 U.S. 658 (1937) (where
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Providing a full APA hearing in toll cases is particularly important
insofar as rate regulation is not the primary function of the FHWA.4'
Unlike the independent regulatory agencies such as the ICC or the
Civil Aeronautics Board,4" the FHWA does not have a permanent
staff primarily responsible for rate regulation activities or a commis-
sion or board to make the final decision on such matters. The use of
the APA procedure, therefore, provides fairness to all parties and
guarantees that decisions will be reached in a fair and just manner.
C. The Use of Toil Revenue to Support Municipal Services
Early federal legislation prohibited the construction of bridges over
waterways of the United States without congressional consent.4 3
Thereafter, Congress had to pass a separate bill for every proposed
bridge. After years of passing redundant, time-consuming bills, the
General Bridge Act of 1906 was created as a means of eliminating
duplicious work and establishing uniformity in bridge regulations.'
Included among its provisions was the restriction that tolls charged
for passage should be "reasonable and just,"45 although the legisla-
tive history provides little indication of what the term meant or how
plaintiff initially sought to restrain Secretary of War from continuing in force an or-
der setting bridge tolls charged by defendant bridge company, court held that there is
an imperative right in a judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding to a hearing even though
not specifically authorized by statute, there being a constitutional right).
41. The primary responsibility of the FHWA is administration of the multi-billion
dollar Federal-Aid Highway Construction Program. 23 U.S.C. § 101 (1970).
42. The Civil Aeronautics Board was created by Section 201 of the Civil Aero-
nautics Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 973. The Board is an agency of the United States and is
composed of five members appointed by the President with the advice and consent of
the Senate. Each member serves a six-year term. 49 U.S.C. § 1321(a)(1) (1970). The
Board was terminated effective January 1, 1985, by the Airline Deregulation Act of
Oct. 24, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, Tit. XVI, 1 A U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
(1978) (to be codified in 42 U.S.C. § 1301).
43. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 401 (1970). In addition to Congressional consent, the
statute requires that plans be submitted to and approved by the Chief of Engineers
and Secretary of War. This approval is adequate without Congressional consent for
bridges authorized by a state and constructed over waterways the navigable portions
of which are wholly within that state. Id.
44. See generally' H.R. REP. No. 182, 59th Cong., Ist Sess. 1 (1906). The report
submitted by Rep. Wagner, a member of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, cited the need for uniformity of regulation in the construction and opera-
tion of bridges spanning navigable waters as the objective behind the act. Such a
statute would eliminate the need for "cumbering up of the statute books by repeating
in each bridge bill the same provision." Id.
45. 33 U.S.C. § 494 (1970).
19791
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it was to be defined.46 Congress, in imposing the reasonableness re-
quirement, was surely aware of the recent Supreme Court opinion in
Covington,47 where the term was discussed in connection with a pri-
vately-owned toll road. In Covington the Court made it clear that the
right of the public to use a highway without being charged an exorbi-
tant price could not be subordinated to the interests of the road com-
pany's stockholders in earning a dividend.4" This balancing of
interests between the tollpayers and the bridge owners has continued
to play an important role in virtually every subsequent proceeding
under the Act.4 9
Another factor in determining reasonableness is the rate charged
by competing facilities. A 1935 decision by the Secretary of War low-
ered the tolls on a bridge across the Ohio River owned by the Par-
kersburg Community Bridge Company.5" The owners of a
competing bridge appealed to a federal court on due process grounds,
arguing that they had not been given the opportunity to present evi-
dence regarding the effect that a reduction in tolls would have in di-
46. See H.R. RF-p. No. 182, 59th Cong. 1st Sess. 2 (1906). The phrase "such tolls
shall be reasonable and just" appears only in the first paragraph of the committee's
suggested amendments to the bill as approved by the Secretary of War and the Chief
of Engineers, but no accompanying explanation of the term is contained in the report.
47. 164 U.S. 578 (1896). The Kentucky Legislature created the turnpike company
in 1834 for the purpose of constructing a road from Covington to Lexington. The act
also regulated toll rates. Later, two new corporations were formed to control parts of
the road. After two subsequent acts, in 1865 and 1890, reducing the rates, one of the
companies chose to disregard the regulations and raised the toll rates. Users living on
or near the turnpike road then brought suit for an injunction restraining the company
from exacting higher tolls than prescribed by the legislature. Id. at 580. The injunc-
tion was granted and judgment was affirmed by the state court of appeals. On appeal
to the United States Supreme Court the company argued that it was denied due pro-
cess of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, because the lower rates al-
lowed by the legislature amount to a deprivation of the company's property. Id.
48. In holding that the company had presented a prima facie case of the validity
of the 1890 statute, the Supreme Court set down criteria to be followed on remand,
one of which was that the public interest, in addition to the interest of the stockhold-
ers, was to be considered in assessing a reasonable and just rate. Id. at 595-96.
49. See City of Burlington v. Turner, 336 F. Supp. 594, 608 (S.D. Ia. 1972), rev'd
on other grounds, 471 F.2d 120 (1973) (administrator must consider the impact of the
toll rate on each user class to avoid having toll structure deemed arbitrary and capri-
cious); Clarksburg-Columbus Short Route Bridge Co. v. Woodring, 89 F.2d 788 (D.C.
Cir. 1937), rev'd and remanded/or dismissal as moot, 302 U.S. 658 (1937) (the exist-
ence of competing bridges and their effect on toll payers must be considered).
50. See Clarksburg-Columbus Short Route Bridge Co. v. Woodring, 89 F.2d 788,
789 (D.C. Cir. 1937), rev'd and remanded per curiam for dismissal as moot, 302 U.S.
658 (1937).
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verting traffic away from their facility.5 The court agreed that both
the competing bridges and the diversion of traffic were factors that
should be considered.52 Since that time, these two elements have
played an essential role in toll regulation decisions.
The next case under the 1906 Act, City of Burlington v. Turner,53
arose in 1970 when a large number of complaints charged that tolls
for passage over the MacArthur Bridge, which spanned the Missis-
sippi River from Burlington, Iowa, to Henderson County, Illinois,
were not just and reasonable. The bridge owner, the City of Burling-
ton, cancelled a "free return" privilege, in effect enforcing a one-hun-
dred percent increase in the toll.
Evidence introduced at the administrative hearing proved that the
toll revenue, even before the increase, exceeded an amount necessary
to pay for operational and maintenance expenses as well as amortiza-
tion of the bond debt that had been incurred to pay for the bridge
construction. The "excess" revenue was intended for general munici-
pal expenses such as street maintenance, sanitation, airport construc-
tion and operation, and police and fire protection. While bridge
revenue had long been diverted for these other uses, Burlington
sought increased toll revenues to pay higher salaries to its police and
fire departments.54
Although a hearing examiner upheld the tolls based on a compari-
son to other Mississippi River bridges," the Administrator reversed,
citing a congressional policy that had evolved since the 1906 Act was
passed.56 He found that, since 1926, each Act authorizing the con-
struction of a bridge restricted all tolls to an amount sufficient to "pay
for the cost of maintaining, repairing, and operating the bridge and
its approaches and to provide a sinking fund sufficient to amortize
the cost of such bridge and its approaches as soon as possible under
reasonable charges."57 This language, indicative of the "free roads
51. 89 F.2d at 789.
52. 89 F.2d at 793.
53. 336 F. Supp. 594 (S.D. Ia. 1972), ajfd as modified, 471 F.2d 120 (8th Cir.
1973).
54. In the Matter of MacArthur Bridge Tolls, (Administrator's Decision, Burling-
ton, Iowa, April 30, 1971).
55. In the Matter of MacArthur Bridge Tolls, (Hearing Examiner's Decision, Bur-
lington, Iowa, September 10, 1971).
56. In the Matter of MacArthur Bridge Tolls, (Administrator's Decision, Burling-
ton, Iowa, April 30, 1971).
57. See FORMS FOR BRIDGES BILLS, S. Doc. No. 103, 69th Cong., Ist Sess. 6
1979]
Washington University Open Scholarship
URBAN LAW ANNUAL
and bridges" movement,58 prompted the Administrator to deny
bridge tolls intended to pay for general municipal services.
The district court, on review, found that the Administrator was in
error when he restricted revenues to an amount sufficient to pay for
the cost and maintenance of the bridge.59 In place of that test, the
court suggested a very broad standard that would consider other sim-
ilar tolls, physical characteristics of the bridge, the amount and na-
ture of traffic, other transportation conditions, traffic origins and
destinations, effect of the tolls on particular classes of users, external
costs, and benefits to local users.6" With regard to the last considera-
tion, the court found it proper to consider how the bridge-owning
community would otherwise pay for such things as streets and police
61protection.
The Eighth Circuit upheld the conclusion of the district court that
the Administrator had been in error, but did not endorse the reasona-
bleness test suggested by the lower court. Finding that consideration
of a multiplicity of factors was too broad, the court suggested a test
based on allowing the bridge owner a fair return on invested capi-
tal.62 The court made it clear that the methods of setting rates used
by Burlington, the Administrator, and the district court, were equally
unacceptable since none of the three were intended to establish just
and reasonable rates.63
(1926). Form 7, providing for the construction and regulation of municipally owned
toll bridges, further states that once a sufficient sinking fund has been established to
pay the cost of the bridge, the bridge is to be operated toll free, or at a rate no higher
than to provide for care and maintenance. Section 4 continues by requiring that a
record of collections and expenditures be maintained and be made available to all
interested parties. Id. This latter provision indicates that the public interest in the
matter of rate collections is to be considered.
58. See 67 CoNG. REC. 8528 (1926). As the Senate record pointed out, the move-
ment by the federal government toward free bridges was apparent in the policy of the
Bureau of Roads of the Department of Agriculture to recommend that Congress with-
hold federal aid to bridges and highways not operated toll free. Congress adopted
this policy by refusing to grant expenditures for non-toll free bridges linking federal-
aid highways. Id. at 8531.
59. City of Burlington v. Turner, 336 F. Supp. 594 (S.D. Iowa 1972), a f'dasmodi-
fled, 471 F.2d 120 (8th Cir. 1973).
60. 336 F.2d at 607.
61. Id.
62. 471 F.2d at 123.
63. "The method Burlington used in setting tolls was based primarily on its
financial needs, unrelated to the bridge, and is no more reasonable or just than the
determination made by the Administrator." Id.
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The judicial and administrative decisions concerning the MacAr-
thur Bridge' established two of the major criteria for making deci-
sions under the General Bridge Act of 1906: the rate of return on
investment and the consideration of related facilities. It was not until
later, however, that these concepts were refined into workable stand-
ards for determining whether the toll revenue could be used for other
purposes such as subsidizing mass transit. One definite conclusion
that can be drawn from the Burlington decisions is that people who
pay tolls on a municipally-owned bridge will not be required to sup-
port general governmental services that are unrelated to any benefit
they receive from the use of the bridge.
II. DELAWARE RIVER PORT AUTHORITY V. TIEMANN 65
While Burlington was on appeal, the Delaware River Port Author-
ity (DRPA)66 increased the tolls on its two bridges.67 Complaints
were filed soon thereafter and a long line of administrative hearings
and court proceedings began. DRPA, which owned the bridges,
subsidized the Port Authority Transit Company, which operated a
commuter rail line between suburban New Jersey and downtown
Philadelphia. It also operated a World Trade Division whose pur-
pose was to promote commercial activities within the Port of Phil-
adelphia.
The DRPA-owned bridges were constructed under the authority of
the General Bridge Act of 1946.68 Under the Act, the reasonableness
64. After Burlington was remanded to the Administrator for a finding consistent
with the appellate court's decision, another administrative hearing was held at which
Burlington introduced evidence of its investment in the bridge. The Administrative
Law Judge computed the depreciated investment in the facility and concluded that
the city should be able to receive a rate of return of 8%. The 8% figure was based on
testimony that the city would have been able to receive an 8% return had it invested
its money in triple A corporate bonds. In the Matter of MacArthur Bridge Tolls,
(Administrator's Decision, Burlington, Iowa, April 19, 1974).
65. 403 F. Supp. 1117 (D.N.J. 1975), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 531
F.2d 699 (3d Cir. 1976), on remand, 421 F. Supp. 142 (D.N.J. 1976).
66. DRPA is a bi-state public authority created by compact between Pennsylvania
and New Jersey. 47 Stat. 308 (1932), as amended, 66 Stat. 738 (1952); N.J. STAT.
ANN. §§ 32:3-1 to 3-18 (1963); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, §§ 3503-3505 (Purdon 1961).
67. The increases were on the Ben Franklin and Walt Whitman bridges. Subse-
quently, DRPA has opened two new bridges connecting New Jersey and Phi-
ladolphia, the Betsy Ross and the Commodore Barry bridges.
68. 33 U.S.C. §§ 525-533 (1970). This Act gives congressional approval to the
construction of all future bridges which comply with its requirements, eliminating the
necessity for separate approval of each proposed bridge. 1d. at § 525 (a).
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of toll rates would ordinarily be easy to determine because publicly-
owned bridges are restricted to charging tolls that provide mainte-
nance costs and a sinking fund to pay off, within thirty years, all con-
struction CoStS. 69 After building debts are satisfied, the bridge must
become toll free.7" Not so with the DRPA: In approving an amend-
ment to the Delaware River Port Authority Compact that allowed the
DRPA to conduct and operate a mass transit line, Congress altered
the standard under which these particular toll rates were judged.
This alteration reflected the desire of both New Jersey and Penn-
sylvania to use toll bridge revenues to fund a proposed high speed
rail commuter line.7 ' Congressional approval of the compact left the
DRPA free from the 1946 Act's restrictions, but imposed one specific
control:
That, as a specific exemption from the provisions of Section 506
of the General Bridge Act of 1946, as amended, the collection of
tolls for the use of any bridge hereafter constructed or acquired
by the commission, in excess of amounts reasonably required for
the operation and maintenance thereof under economical man-
agement, shall cease at the expiration of fifty years from the date
[the bridge is open to traffic], and the rate of such tolls shall be
subject to the provisions of Section 503 of the General Bridge
Act of 1946, as amended.72
Section 503 of the 1946 Act7 3 establishes the same reasonable and
just standard as the 1906 General Bridge Act;74 thus it seemed that
the DRPA was restricted only to the reasonable and just standard
that had governed toll rates since the 1906 Act rather than the newer
toll rate "formula" applicable to publicly-owned facilities found in
the 1946 legislation.
After a series of administrative hearings, necessitated in part by the
energy crisis,7 the Administrator issued an order lowering the tolls to
69. Id. at § 529.
70. Id.
71. See H.R. REP. No. 2293, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 2, 3 (1952) (recommending that
bridge tolls also be used to support non-bridge facilities which would tend to develop
a more comprehensive rapid transportation system designed to aid local users).
72. H.R. REP. No. 8315, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 3 reprinted in [1952] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 700, 709.
73. Currently codified at 33 U.S.C. § 526 (1970).
74. Compare 33 U.S.C. § 526 with 33 U.S.C. § 494.
75. See In the Matter of Bridge Tolls on Bridges Operated by the Delaware River
Port Auth. (Administrator's Order and Decision, May 19, 1975). An original round of
hearings held in 1972 resulted in a decision by the Administrator that the toll increase
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a level below those initially set by the DRPA.76 The DRPA immedi-
ately appealed to the district court, asking for a stay of the new rates
until the appeal could be heard on the merits.77 On appeal the
DRPA alleged that the Administrator had acted illegally by setting a
toll rate that would yield an insufficient return in relation to pledges
made to bondholders.
78
A. The "Reasonable and Just Standard"
The court, in addressing the meaning of "reasonable and just" as
used in the 1946 Act,79 was faced with two ratemaking standards.
The first involved the Burlington test, which looked to see whether
the DRPA was realizing a fair return on its original investment. The
second approach involved deference to the Administrator, who set
the toll rate after balancing a number of conflicting interests.
The Administrator had considered the DRPA's financial position,
the effect of an increased toll on tollpayers, and the public interest to
be served by the toll increase."0 This latter category included the ef-
fect a toll increase might have on discouraging auto use during the
energy crisis and the ability of utilizing the toll system to encourage
the use of carpools.
The court took this broader approach, finding that the Administra-
should be rolled back. (Administrator's Decision June 1, 1972). The basis for the
decision was the DRPA had underestimated traffic projections and had not consid-
ered other sources of revenue. While an appeal of this decision was pending, the oil
embargo occurred resulting in a sharp decline in the number of vehicles using the
bridges. Because of this and in order to consider a new carpool rate proposed by the
DRPA, the Administrator ordered a completely new round of hearings. These new
hearings were held in 1974.
76. Id. (Administrator's Order and Decision 7, May 19, 1978). For a discussion of
the rate reductions see Delaware River Port Auth. v. Tiemann, 403 F. Supp. 1117,
1120-21 (D. N.J. 1975).
77. DRPA's request for a stay was granted. Delaware River Port Auth. v. Tie-
mann, No. 75-1219 (D. N.J. July 23, 1975).
78. See Delaware River Port Auth. v. Tiemann, 403 F. Supp. 1117 (D. N.J. 1975),
vacated and remanded on other grounds, 531 F.2d 699 (3d Cir. 1976), on remand, 421
F. Supp. 142 (D. N.J. 1976). Other allegations on appeal were that the Administrator
had denied DRPA due process of law by reopening the administrative record after
the hearings were concluded, and had violated the National Environmental Policy
Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4332-4334 (1970), by failing to file an environmental impact state-
ment. 403 F. Supp. at 1142.
79. 33 U.S.C. § 526 (1970).
80. In the Matter of Bridge Tolls on Bridges Operated by the Delaware River Port
Auth. (Administrator's Order and Decision May 19, 1978).
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tor had successfully balanced various conflicting interests of higher
tolls, needed revenue, and traffic reduction against lower tolls, less
revenue, and increased traffic.81 The decision concluded that rate
regulation of an entity providing a necessary public service is an ac-
tivity that frequently involves the weighing of many subtle, intangible
qualitative factors.8 2 Supporting this approach are examples of rate
regulation from other industries.83 Perhaps the most important sup-
port came from the Supreme Court decision of Federal Power Com-
mission v. Hope Natural Gas Company, 4 which held that a court, in
reviewing an administrative rate regulation decision, should look at
the result reached rather than the particular path chosen.
By allowing the Administrator to both balance intangible and tan-
gible factors and to consider public needs, as well as those of the
bridge owner and the individual tollpayers, the scope of administra-
tive inquiry is flexible, and permits the consideration of national
transportation policy as an influencing factor.
The court rejected DRPA's argument that Burlington established
the principle that a bridge owner is entitled to a fair rate of return.
Instead of adopting the Burlington approach, the court found that
DRPA, as a quasi-governmental entity, had no right to profit from
public use of its facilities."
The court's rationale for distinguishing the Burlington standard of
"reasonable and just" is the major weakness of the opinion. The
owner of the bridge in Burlington was a city, not a private company.
Certainly if the DRPA as a quasi-governmental agency is not entitled
to profit from the operation of its public facilities, the same rationale
81. 403 F. Supp. 1130.
82. Id. at 1128. See also SEC v. New England System, 390 U.S. 207, 211(1968)
(upheld SEC order based upon assessment of a variety of subtle and intangible fac-
tors).
83. Atcheson, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. v. Board of Trade, 412 U.S. 800 (1973)
(ICC's ratemaking authority is broad but not unlimited). See Board of Trade v.
United States, 314 U.S. 534 (1942) (upholding enforcement of an ICC order affecting
transportation rates for grain).
84. 320 U.S. 591 (1944), citedin Delaware River Port Auth. v. Tiemann, 403 F.
Supp. 1117, 1127 (D. N.J. 1975). In Hope the Supreme Court upheld an FPC order
reducing gas rates on the ground that the rate reduction still provided a "just and
reasonable" return. Id. at 605. The Court focused on the impact of the ratemaking
order upon the company rather than the specific formula employed in establishing
rates. Id. at 602. See also FPC v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U.S. 575, 586 (1942)
(ratemaking agencies not required to utilize a single method for determining rates).
85. 403 F. Supp. at 1123-24.
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can also be applied to the city. Therefore, the first distinction men-
tioned by the court is not convincing. The second distinction, that
Burlington was decided under the 1906 Act whereas DJPA fell under
the 1946 Act, is similarly unconvincing. The 1906 Act applied a plain
"reasonable and just" standard to all bridges subject to its jurisdic-
tion.86 The 1946 Act also applied a "reasonable and just" standard to
all bridges,87 with the added restriction for publicly owned bridges
that the tolls be limited to pay reasonable maintenance and operation
expenses and enough to repay the original investment within thirty
years.88 Since the DRPA was exempt from this latter restriction,89 it
was subject to toll regulation under the same "reasonable and just"
language used in Burlington.
B. The Standard of Review
Another aspect of the decision was most certainly correct. The
standard of review in toll cases was identified as the substantial evi-
dence test as set out in the APA.9" The DRPA Court defined this to
mean that the agency's decision must be supported by such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.9" In applying this test, the court concluded that defer-
ence must be given to the decisions of an agency with expertise in a
particular area.92 The court noted that the FHWA had acquired ex-
pertise in toll cases through its involvement in Burlington and several
prior cases, and that the lack of expertise specifically mentioned by
the Burlington court no longer existed.93
C. Contractual Rights of Bondholders
The DRPA raises capital to finance its projects through the sale of
86. 33 U.S.C. § 494 (1970).
87. 33 U.S.C. § 526 (1970).
88. 33 U.S.C. § 529 (1970).
89. See note 72 and accompanying text supra.
90. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1970).
91. 403 F. Supp. at 1126, retying on Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S.
197, 229 (1938).
92. 403 F. Supp. at 1127, relying on Consolo v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 383
U.S. 607, 620 (1966) (upholding finding of Federal Maritime Comm'n that repara-
tions should be paid by a shipping company that violated the Shipping Act to a com-
petitor).
93. 403 F. Supp. at 1127.
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revenue bonds. In order to market its bonds at a fair price and still
assure stability of the bonds in the market, the DRPA has entered
into a number of covenants designed to protect the bondholders' in-
vestments. Two of the covenants at issue in the toll case were con-
tracts whereby DRPA agreed to pursue varying policies that were
hinged upon the amount of revenue received in relation to bond com-
mitments. For example, one of these covenants provided that the
DRPA would not lower the tolls unless the ratio of net revenues
available to meet bond service obligations was at least 1.60 (160%) in
the preceding calendar year and would be, among other require-
ments, 1.40 (140%) in each of the two succeeding years.94 The second
covenant required that revenues be equal to 120% of bond service
requirements for each calendar year.95
Although the Administrator's toll schedule permitted the DRPA to
meet the 120% requirement, it did not allow enough revenue to meet
the 160% test. Because of this the DRPA claimed that the Adminis-
trator's decision violated the contract clause of the Constitution and
should therefore be set aside.9 6
The court rejected DRPA's argument. First, it pointed out that
DRPA's bondholder purchases bonds with the understanding that
toll rates were subject to federal control under the 1946 General
Bridge Act. DRPA's prospectus on the sale of the bonds specifically
mentioned the power of the Federal Highway Administrator to ad-
just toll rates. Second, in approving the 1952 amendment to the In-
terstate Compact, Congress included a provision stating that nothing
in the compact could be construed as affecting or impairing the
power or jurisdiction of any department, board, bureau, or officer of
the United States.97 In further support of this position, the court
cited cases from other fields upholding the authority of regulatory
agencies to make decisions abrogating existing contracts98 and men-
tioned that the contract clause of the Constitution applies to state
94. Id. at 1132.
95. Id. at 1135.
96. Id. at 1138. See U.S. CONST. Art. 1, § 10.
97. 66 Stat. 738 (1952). See generally H.R. REP. No. 2293, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 3
(1952).
98. See Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. FPC, 142 F.2d 943 (10th Cir. 1944), afW'd,
324 U.S. 581 (1945) (FPC orders requiring gas companies to reduce excessive rates
challenged as abrogating prior contracts but upheld by imputing to contracting par-
ties knowledge of Congress' plenary power to regulate interstate commerce).
[Vol. 16 193
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol16/iss1/5
TOLL BRIDGE REGULATION
rather than federal action.9 9
Following the district court decision, the Third Circuit vacated the
decision, remanding the case for further consideration of whether the
record supported the Administrator's conclusion that revenues avail-
able under the new toll schedule would be sufficient to support
DRPA's "total activities."'"
On remand the Administrator reasserted his findings that the rec-
ord supported his original conclusion. The matter was again ap-
pealed to the district court, which upheld the Administrator's
decision a second time.'01 The DRPA withdrew its appeal to the
Third Circuit when the Administrator amended his toll order so that
it expired on November 30, 1977.102 The DRPA was then free to
raise its tolls without prior approval from the Administrator. 0 3
The DRPA decision is important because of the Third Circuit's
sanction of the Administrator's broad discretionary power to decide
toll cases. The Administrator can freely consider a wide range of fac-
tors, including national transportation and environmental policies.
In DP/RA this discretion is exemplified by the importance attached to
energy conservation. The goal of discouraging gasoline waste justi-
fied adopting a special carpool rate as part of the toll structure. Simi-
larly, concern for contemporary mass transit strategy supported the
conclusion allowing DRPA to use toll revenues to offset a reasonable
deficit on its high speed commuter line (PATCO).
III. THE NEW YORK TOLL CASE-AUTOMOBILE CLUB OF NEW
YORK V. COX1°4
In April 1975 the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey
99. 403 F. Supp. at 1138 n.63.
100. Delaware River Port Auth. v. Tiemann, 531 F.2d 699, 702 (3rd Cir. 1976).
101. Delaware River Port Auth. v. Tiemann, 421 F. Supp. 142 (D. N.J. 1976).
102. See 42 Fed. Reg. 37892-93 (July 25, 1977).
103. On February 1, 1978, DRPA again raised its toll for cars. Commuter and
truck rates were also increased, but bus fares and carpool rates remained the same.
Soon after the toll increase four individuals and one organization, the Automobile
Clubs of Southern New Jersey, filed complaints with the Federal Highway Adminis-
trator. The investigation that was ordered by the Administrator set in motion the
latest in this long line of Philadelphia bridge toll cases. See In the Matter of Tolls on
Bridges Owned by the Delaware River Port Authority, FHWA Docket No. 78-15T
(filed Feb. 28, 1978).
104. 444 F. Supp. 174 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
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(PONY) °5 increased the tolls on its bridges for the first time in fifty-
four years of operation. °6 The Federal Highway Administration re-
ceived a number of complaints asking that the increase be found un-
reasonable under the General Bridge Act of 1906.1°7
The stated purpose of the toll increase, according to PONY, was to
provide additional revenues necessary to finance construction of new
mass transit projects.' PONY took the position that its interstate
compact permitted it to subsidize these new mass transit projects
from toll revenue. The lead complainant in the case, the Automobile
Club of New York, argued that PONY was not permitted to provide
an unlimited subsidy to its other projects by charging high bridge
tolls, but was restricted by the decision in Burlington to receiving an
amount of toll revenue that would provide a fair return on its bridge
investment alone.
At the hearing to decide the reasonableness of rates in relation to
the "need" to subsidize other facilities, the Administrator determined
that economic reasonableness should be measured by whether PONY
received a fair return on its investment in the facilities.' °9 This ap-
105. The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey (PONY) was created by
Interstate Compact in 1921 and given the authority to develop public transportation,
terminals and other facilities of commerce within the port district. S.J. Res. 88, 42
Stat. 174 (1921); N.J. REV. STAT. §§ 32:1-I to 1-174 (1963); N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAWS
§§ 6401-6423, 7002 (65 McKinney 1961). The authority owns or operates four
bridges, two tunnels, one rapid rail line (PATH), two bus terminals, seven marine
terminals, four airports including Newark, LaGuardia and Kennedy, two heliports
and the World Trade Center.
106. The bridges owned by PONY are the Bayonne, Goethals, George Washing-
ton, and Outerbridge Crossing. At the same time the tolls were also increased on
PONY's two trans-Hudson vehicular tunnels, the Lincoln and Holland Tunnels. All
bridges owned by PONY are subject to regulation under the 1906 General Bridge
Act. 33 U.S.C. §§ 525-533 (1970).
107. Eventually, there were 33 parties to the proceeding. Included were Con-
gressmen Gilman, Peyser and Murphy opposing the increase and the Citizens for
Clean Air, Environmental Defense Fund and City of New York supporting the in-
crease.
108. The toll increase raised the automobile charge from $1 to $1.50 round-trip on
all crossings, the commuter rate to $1 from $.50, and the truck rates by 50%. At the
same time PONY initiated a special carpool discount for vehicles carrying three or
more. The projects to be financed from the toll increase were: expansion by 50% of
PONY's downtown bus terminal; extension of the Port Authority Trans-Hudson
(PATH) rapid rail line to Plainfield, N.J.; the direct rail link to New York's Penn
Station for New Jersey rail commuters; and a rail link to Kennedy International Air-
port. Minutes, Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, Board of Commission-
ers, April 10, 1975.
109. In the Matter of the Bayonne Bridge, Goethals Bridge, George Washington
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proach was used to avoid waste, cover expenses, and allow PONY to
attract further capital in the market place. It was suggested that a six
to eight percent rate of return was "reasonable." l
A. Formulation of a Rate Base
Because there was little dispute among the parties regarding the
economic test to be applied and no dispute about the financial data
provided by PONY, the economic aspect of the case turned on which
facilities should be included in the rate base. That is, the key deci-
sion was whether facilities other than the bridges, especially the rapid
transit line, PATH, should be included. If PATH were included, vir-
tually any toll increase would be reasonable from a purely economic
standpoint since PATH generated a large deficit. Charging the
PATH deficit against the bridge toll revenue would reduce the net
revenue level to a rate of return well within the reasonable range.
The three major parties advanced different arguments on these is-
sues. The Auto Club took the position that Burlington prevented in-
clusion of non-bridge related facilities in calculating the rate of
return. Under this theory, the rate of return on investment in the
George Washington Bridge must be computed on the basis of cost,
depreciation, and expenses of that facility alone.
Public Counsel and PONY disagreed with the Auto Club. They
argued that the Administrator should include in the rate base all fa-
cilities that are functionally related to the bridges, with functional re-
lationship determined by the substitutability among the facilities.
Because the users of the regulated bridge receive a definite benefit
from the other facility, they should help pay the costs of keeping that
other facility in operation.
The Administrator accepted the functional relation theory ad-
vanced by Public Counsel and PONY."' There is a firm legal basis
to this approach since courts have recognized that a regulatory
agency, in exercising rulemaking authority, can consider nonjurisdic-
tional matters in computing rate of return.' 2 In so doing, the agency
Bridge, and Outerbridge Crossing, No. 76-9, Public Counsel Exhibit 7 (transcript No-
vember 8, 1976, at 7).
110. Id. Administrator's Decision (August 9, 1977).
111. Id. at 14.
112. See FPC v. Conway Corp., 426 U.S. 271, 279-82 (1976) (although FPC has
no jurisdiction over retail rates, it may take those rates into account when setting
interstate wholesale rates.)
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may determine whether certain facilities or groups of facilities pro-
vide a significant benefit to the users of the regulated facility." 3 In
analyzing the facts presented at the hearing, the Administrator deter-
mined that all surface transportation facilities owned by PONY were
functionally related. '" Each of the surface facilities contributed to a
system of traffic flow, and were interrelated to the extent that should
any of the facilities cease to function, congestion would have in-
creased on the others.' 5 In this way the toll payers on the bridges
received a benefit from the existence of other facilities in the rate
base.
The Administrator found legal justification for this approach in the
authority granted to PONY in its interstate compact. That compact
gave PONY the power to purchase, construct, lease, and/or operate
any terminal or transportation facility within its jurisdiction in order
to coordinate terminal transportation and other facilities." 6 Prior
authorization by Congress allowed PONY to exercise such additional
powers and duties as may be conferred on it by the concurrent legis-
lation of both New York and New Jersey." 7 Among the additional
powers specifically granted by the states were authorization to pool
all revenues to subsidize deficit-producing activities,"' and the au-
thority to take over and operate the PATH mass transit system." 9
113. See Interstate Power Co. v. FPC, 236 F.2d 372 (8th Cir. 1956), cert. denied,
352 U.S. 967 (1957) (considering, among other factors, relative benefit to users of
natural gas of power company's uniform rates).
114. The facilities found to be functionally related to the bridges were the two
tunnels, the bus terminals and PATH. All other facilities were excluded including the
deficit-producing World Trade Center.
115. In the Matter of the Bayonne Bridge, Goethals Bridge, George Washington
Bridge, and Outerbridge Crossing, No. 76-9, Administrator's Decision (August 9,
1977).
116. S.J. Res. 88, 42 Stat. 174, 177 (1921); N.J. REV. STAT. § 32:1-7 (1963). N.Y.
UNCONSOL. LAWS § 6407 (65 McKinney 1961).
117. Id.
118. N.J. REV. STAT. § 32:1-142 (1963); N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAWS § 7002 (65 Mc-
Kinney 1961).
119. N.J. REV. STAT. §§ 32.1, 35.52 (Supp. 1977); N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAWS § 6603
(65 McKinney Supp. 1977). The authority to enter into such activities without subse-
quent explicit approval from Congress was upheld in a series of cases. Courtesy
Sandwich Shop, Inc. v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 379, 190 N.E.2d
402, 240 N.Y.S.2d I (1963), appeal dismissedfor lack of a substantialfederal question,
375 U.S. 78 (1963) (prior congressional approval was not required before PONY
could take over the PATH system). See also Port Auth. Bondholder Protective
Comm. v. Port Auth., 387 F.2d 259, 261-62 (2d Cir. 1967); Kheel v. Port Auth., 331 F.
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B. Consideration of Transportation Policy
The Administrator was careful to state that several other consider-
ations existed beyond just the financial element, and mentioned as
examples the effect on tollpayers, comparative tolls on other bridges,
any history of toll increases, and the presence of legitimate federal
interests."0 The latter is the most important, since consideration of
federal interests allows the Administrator to evaulate toll rate in-
creases in light of stated national tranportation policy.
The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA),' 2 ' which
requires all federal agencies to consider the environmental effects of
their decisions, 122 is one specific statement of a legitimate federal in-
terest capable of consideration as an influencing factor. NEPA's en-
vironmental requirement applies in adjudicatory matters including
ratemaking, 23 and in situations where the effect of the action may be
beneficial rather than detrimental to environmental quality. 124 Based
on the requirements of this Act, the Administrator gave full consider-
ation to environmental factors in reaching the PONY rate decision.
Foremost among ,these factors was the potential impact on air quality
caused by any changes in traffic patterns.125
Supp. 118, 120-21 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), at'd on other grounds. 457 F.2d 46, cert. denied,
409 U.S. 983 (1972).
120. In the Matter of The Bayonne Bridge, Goethals Bridge, George Washington
Bridge, and Outerbridge Crossing, No. 76-9 Administrator's Decision (August 9,
1977).
121. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
122. Id. at § 4332.
123. United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures
(SCRAP), 422 U.S. 289, 318-19 (1975) (a proceeding before the ICC is a "major fed-
eral action" within NEPA and requires an environmental impact statement if the
proceeding has a substantial effect on the environment).
124. See Hiram Clarke Civic Club, Inc. v. Lynn, 476 F.2d 421,427 (5th Cir. 1973)
(a close reading of NEPA discloses that Congress was concerned with all potential
environmental effects [both adverse and beneficial] on the quality of the human envi-
ronment); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Grant, 341 F. Supp. 356, 367
(E.D.N.C. 1972) (a "major federal action" that "substantially affects, beneficially or
detrimentally," the quality of the environment requires an environmental impact
statement).
125. In the Matter of the Bayonne Bridge, Goethals Bridge, George Washington
Bridge, and Outerbridge Crossing, No. 76-9 Administrator's Opinion (November 7,
1977). Public Counsel introduced at the hearing a draft environmental assessment
prepared by the FHWA. Public Counsel Exhibits 3, 3a. This assessment became a
negative declaration of the Administrator when he adopted it in the final decision.
Id. The parties to the proceeding who were interested in the environmental aspect of
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The requirement that environmental effects be considered also al-
lowed the Administrator to address other national policy issues. Par-
ties to the case had introduced evidence about the effects a toll
increase would have on reducing traffic congestion, encouraging car
pooling, and the general availability of mass transit. The Adminis-
trator weighed this evidence, finding that the toll schedule helped
promote mass transit in two ways. First, it provided sufficient fund-
ing to develop new mass transit facilities while subsidizing the old;
second, it encouraged people to use mass transit.126
An important part of the Administrator's decision addressed the
issue of peak-hour pricing. Economists testified that since the bridge
was designed and constructed to meet the demands of peak-hour use,
the peak-hour users should be charged a greater portion of the "rea-
sonable and just" toll because it was their demand that made neces-
sary the initial capital investment in the structure. The
environmental groups testified that, as a method of reducing conges-
tion and air pollution, the peak-hour users had to be charged a toll
high enough to discourage use. Both groups agreed that PONY
should consider some form of peak-hour pricing strategy. The Ad-
ministrator agreed with the experts, ordering PONY to submit a fea-
sibility study on peak-hour pricing to provide sufficient data to
support a final decision. Consideration of the peak-hour pricing was
a breakthrough in the consideration of national transportation policy
matters.
The Administrator's authority to consider national transportation
policy is also supported by prior court decisions concerning toll rates
and other areas of administrative determinations. The DRPA case,
for instance, emphasized the federal interest in gasoline conserva-
tion. 27 The case of Clarksburg-Columbus Short Route Bridge Co. v.
Woodring, 28 considered the federal interest in operating all area
bridges, including those not regulated by the FHWA, in an efficient
the case, the Citizens for Clean Air and the Environmental Defense Fund, accepted
without question the assessment prepared by the FHWA.
126. Id.
127. Delaware River Port Auth. v. Tiemann, 403 F. Supp. 1117, 1129 (D. N.J.
1975), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 531 F.2d 699 (3d Cir. 1976), on re-
mand, 421 F. Supp. 142 (D. N.J. 1976).
128. 89 F.2d 788, 793 (D.C. Cir.), rev'd and remanded per curiamfor dismissal as
moot, 302 U.S. 658 (1937) (when reducing toll rates on regulated bridges considera-
tion must be given to the competitive effect on all area toll bridges to assure efficient
distribution of traffic).
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manner to meet the demands of traffic. Additionally, Congress has
specifically required consideration of national transporation policy
by some agencies during the decisionmaking process.'
29
C. Court Decision in the PONY case
Following the Administrator's decision to allow the increased tolls,
the Automobile Club of New York appealed to the district court. 3
The sole issue raised for judicial review was whether the Administra-
tor acted within his competence and legal authority in permitting
PONY to use bridge tolls in subsidizing interestate facilities "related
to" the bridges. The court in Automobile Club of New York v. Cox,'II
granted dismissal basing its decision on the legislative history of the
1952 Delaware River Port Authority Compact, which reveals a con-
gressional intention to allow PONY to apply toll revenues to related
non-bridge facilities.' 32 The court also referred to Burlington, hold-
ing that use of bridge revenues for related non-bridge purposes is not
per se unreasonable. 33
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's opin-
ion, but raised certain questions about the accuracy of a number of
findings of the District Court and the Administrator. 34 The Court of
Appeals' disagreement with the lower court and the Administrator
centered on the treatment of PATH, the Port Authority's mass transit
line.
129. See 49 U.S.C. § 1 (1970) (requring the ICC to consider federal transportation
policy in its decisionmaking process). See also Schaffer Transp. Co. v. United States,
355 U.S. 83 (1957) ("The National Transportation Policy, formulated by Congress,
specifies in its terms that it is to govern the [Interstate Commerce] Commission in the
administration and enforcement of all provisions of the [Interstate Commerce] Act."
Id. at 87-88). Accord, Arrow Transp. Co. v. United States, 176 F. Supp. 411 (N.D.
Ala. 1959), affidper curiam sub nom. State Corp. Comm'n. v. Arrow Transp. Co., 361
U.S. 353 (1960) (To eliminate any question on whether the National Transportation
Policy prescribed standards to which the courts would require the Commission to
adhere, Congress enacted the Whittington Amendment. "Congress thus made it clear
that it was imposing on the Commission a positive and active duty to administer each
provision of the Act in such a way as to preserve the inherent advantages of each
mode of transportation." 176 F. Supp. at 416).
130. Automobile Club of N.Y. v. Cox, 444 F. Supp. 174 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
131. Id. at 178.
132. Id. at 177. See H.R. REP. 2293, 82d Cong,, 2d Sess. 2-8 (1952).
133. 444 F. Supp. at 177. See discussion in City of Burlington v. Turner, 336 F.
Supp. 594, 607 (S.D. Iowa 1972), af'd as modijied, 471 F.2d 120 (8th Cir. 1973).
134. Automobile Club of New York v. Cox, No. 78-6054 (2d Cir. Jan. 12, 1979).
1979]
Washington University Open Scholarship
URBAN LAW ANNUAL
The Court of Appeals was critical of the handling of PATH by the
Administrator and the District Court in two areas. First, the Court of
Appeals found it difficult to agree with the lower court and the Ad-
ministrator that the record supported a conclusion that PATH was
functionally related to all other facilities in the rate base, especially
the Staten Island bridges. Second, and more importantly, the Court
of Appeals criticized the Administrator for failing to take into ac-
count the reasonableness of the PATH fare in determining whether to
include the PATH deficit as a charge against revenues in computing
the rate of return. 134a With regard to this, the court noted that the 30-
cent fare results in a deficit ratio of $3.00 expense to every $1.00 of
revenue. Inflation and the history of fares on similar facilities, said
the court, make such a fare prima facie unreasonably low. 134b
As a result of the Court of Appeals' decision, any future toll pro-
ceeding involving PONY will have to address the question of
whether the tollpayer can reasonably be asked to subsidize increasing
mass transit deficits. In deciding this question, the Administrator will
have to issue a finding on the reasonableness of the fares on PATH.
Although the Administrator does not have the statutory authority to
order PONY to raise the charges on PATH, he may exclude from his
rate of return calculations certain expenses attributable to any unrea-
sonably high PATH deficit.
D. Impact of the Pony Proceeding
The PONY decision clearly establishes a standard for determining
the reasonableness of future toll raises under the 1906 Bridge Act.
The Administrator now considers three primary elements: the
financial position of the bridge owner, the impact on the tollpayers,
and relevant legitimate federal interests. The financial position of the
bridge owner will be based on a reasonable return on the investment
in the facilities. 35 The rate base will include all bridges involved
134a. This point was first raised by Public Counsel in the testimony of its traffic
experts and the briefs filed with the Administrative Law Judge and the Administrator.
Brief, Reply Brief, and Exceptions of Public Counsel, No. 76-9. Federal Highway
Administration, Public Counsel argued that the Administrator should only consider a
portion of the PATH deficit in computing the rate of return.
134b. Automobile Club of New York v. Cox, No. 78-6054, slip op. at 18 (2d Cir.
Jan. 12, 1979). The Court of Appeals pointed out that this language predated
PONY's acquisition of PATH by 10 years so that no conclusion as to Congress' opin-
ion on PONY's authority could be deduced.
135. For a criticism of the use of the rate of return concept in toll rate regulation,
see Morris, Retention of a Reasonable and Just Bridge Toll, 30 AD. L.R. 409 (1978).
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plus other "functionally related" facilities operated by the bridge au-
thority. Functional relationship depends on the "substitutability" be-
tween the bridge and the other facilities. Contractual commitment to
bondholders also forms part of the financial test. A contract with a
bondholder, however, will not bar the Administrator from lowering
an unjust toll when other factors in the case so warrant.
The interests of tollpayers are protected by the concept of sub-
stitutability in determining the rate base. This test assures tollpayers
that they will not be forced to pay for facilities from which they re-
ceive no direct benefit. Instead, toll revenues provide financial sup-
port for alternate transportation services, which help reduce the
amount of congestion on the facilities.
The third factor taken into consideration is potentially the most
important. By recognizing that toll increases may reflect legitimate
federal interests, the Administrator has developed a test that might
justify an excess return on investment provided the excess revenue
will be used to further legitimate federal interests. 36
IV. UNANSWERED QUESTIONS
The decision in Automobile Club of New York v. Cox leaves a
number of questions unresolved. PONY had not raised its toll rates
in fifty-four years, and thus the three-pronged test may have no ap-
plication in an instance of frequent toll increases. For example, if
PONY were to raise its toll another fifty percent within a few years of
the first increase, its action may not be justified by merely pointing to
a larger deficit caused by PATH. Because the rapid transit line is
included in the rate base, increased deficits caused by its operation
would only serve to reduce the rate of return from the bridge reve-
nue. Likewise, an increased toll would benefit the bondholders as it
would assure PONY's ability to comply with the convenants of the
bonds. Even if this satisfies the first two elements of the test, how-
ever, the toll increase may still be unreasonable since potentially not
in furtherance of federal interests. Moreover, even if federal trans-
portation policy continues to favor the promotion of mass transpora-
tion and energy conservation, the decision in Automobile Club of New
136. Although this test was developed in a case arising under the 1906 Act, it
would also apply to future toll increases by DRPA or other bridge owners who are
allowed to operate free of the toll rate restrictions of the 1946 Act. See discussion of
DRPA's exemption at note 72 and accompanying text supra.
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York has not provided guidance as to the weight accorded these in-
terests.
To protect tollpayers from new increases every few years due to
continuing mass transit deficit or expansion costs, the Administrator
may want to adopt a limitation on the amount of mass transit loss
includable as an expense in the rate of return on investment. The
formula for determining the appropriate limitation could reflect the
degree of benefit provided to users of toll facilities or the average
percentage of subsidy provided to similar mass transit operations.'
37
This concept, rejected by the Administrator in Automobile Club of
New York v. Cox, has been applied in other ratemaking areas 38 and
was endorsed by the Second Circuit in Automobile Club of New York
v. Cox.
V. TOLL STRUCTURING UNDER THE CLEAN AIR ACT
The Clean Air Act 139 provides comprehensive legislation and regu-
latory standards for improving air quality throughout the country.
States are required to prepare State Implementation Plans (SIP) and
strategies that will meet the established air quality standards.
40
Plans are submitted to the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA)'4' and, upon EPA approval, create an obligation on the part
of the state to commence enforcement. If the plan is disapproved, the
EPA prepares a plan for the state. 1
42
137. For example, the loss includable as an expense could be limited to an
amount necessary to pay for the mass transit facility's share of capital expenses. An-
other possibility is to allow a loss equivalent to the national average for subsidy of
mass transit. Under this test, if the national average showed that fare revenue equal-
led 45% of mass transit expenses, the Administrator would allow the amount that
would result had the mass transit entity charged a fare equal to 45% of costs.
138. See, e.g., FPC v. Conway Corp., 426 U.S. 271 (1976) (FPC may apportion
total expenses between retail and interstate wholesale classes of business and find
interstate wholesale rates excessive if they exceed the costs allocable to that portion of
the business. Id. at 280).
139. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857-1857(l) (Supp. V 1975). Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685
reclassified the Act to 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7401-7642 (1977 Pamphlet).
140. Id. at §§ 1857C-5(a)(3)(A). State standards are adopted following reason-
able notice and public hearings. If the administrator of EPA finds the standards un-
acceptable, the State may revise its plan whenever feasible. Id. at § 1857C-5(a)(3)(B).
141. Id. at § 1857C-5(a)(3)(A).
142. Id. at § 1857C-5(c)(I)(A). Additionally, the EPA will implement its own
plan in cases where the State fails to submit a plan or where a State fails to revise its
plan as instructed.
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One required aspect of the SIP is a transportation element. 143 At
least one state, New York, as part of the transportation section of its
control plan, proposed implementing tolls on certain of its bridges in
an effort to reduce congestion and pollution.'" The imposition of
bridge tolls in furtherance of national transporation policy is consis-
tent with the recommendations of the Department of Transportation
contained in a 1974 study.1 45 That study proposed legislation which
would permit tolls on all bridges in urban areas as part of a strategy
designed to increase mass transit usage. 14 6 The New York SIP in-
cluded a provision calling for tolls on all East River and Harlem
River bridges. Four of these bridges had been constructed or re-
paired with funds provided under the Federal-Aid Highway Act.147
The plan received EPA approval without consideration of the statu-
tory prohibition against imposing tolls on bridges constructed with
federal funds.
148
Only after a series of cases, which ultimately resulted in the ap-
proval of the entire plan,'49 did the legality of imposing tolls on fed-
erally-aided bridges receive any consideration. Even then, the
143. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7501-7508 (West Supp. 1977). The EPA may establish guide-
lines for attainment of air quality standards. Id. at § 7508. Such guidelines include
the requirements for transportation control measures. 43 Fed. Reg. 21673, 21676-77
(1978).
144. New York State Dep't of Envir. Conserv., New York City Metropolitan Area
Air Quality Implementation Plan, Transportation Controls (April 1973) at Strategy
B-7. See id., at 5-5 to 5-6, 7-23 for a discussion of the strategy.
145. SeeTOLL STUDY, note 27 supra.
146. Id.
147. The four bridges in which federal funds were invested are:
Manhattan $70,000,000
Washington 300,000
Alexander Hamilton 6,800,000
Williamsburg 1,300,000
148. 23 U.S.C. § 301 (Supp. VI 1976).
149. See Friends of the Earth v. Carey, 535 F.2d 165, 177-178, (2d Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 920 (1977) (an enforcement order could be issued where a citizen
presented sufficient evidence that New York State had not implemented its Transpor-
tation Control Plan which had received approval by the EPA); Friends of the Earth v.
EPA, 499 F.2d 1118, 1125 (2d Cir. 1974) (state implementation plan designed to com-
pel drivers to use alternative modes of transportation to automobiles by reducing the
number of available parking spaces was reasonable. The State was not required to
create a plan that would attract riders to mass transit); Friends of the Earth v. Carey,
422 F. Supp. 638, 646 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (state must act to enforce its Transportation
Control Plan approved by EPA so as not to interfere with federal regulations and
federal affirmative action).
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question was only addressed in a footnote to the court's opinion. ' 0
In upholding the tolls, the court relied on a letter opinion of the Gen-
eral Counsel of the Department of Transporatation, which was char-
acterized as stating that "there is no federal bar to tolling the four
bridges as part of a traffic control program pursuant to the Clean Air
Act."I51
Subsequent to these decisions, Congress amended the Clean Air
Act to allow a state which had adopted a toll strategy in its SIP to
rescind that strategy.' 5 2 This amendment eliminated the conflict
caused by a state's obligation to enforce its SIP by imposing tolls on
bridges which were required by federal statute to remain free. It al-
lowed the Governor to eliminate the toll strategy on intrastate
bridges upon a showing that other measures would assure a like re-
duction in pollution.'53
The legal difficulty with a toll strategy under the Clean Air Act
involves a possible conflict with the Federal-Aid Highway Act section
301154 prohibition against tolls on roads or bridges constructed with
federal funds. Cases interpreting section 301 clearly establish that it
was designed to prevent the imposition of any kind of charge for the
use of federally funded facilities. 5  The clear legislative history of
the Highway Act makes it questionable whether a toll implementa-
tion strategy under the Clean Air Act would be invalid if not re-
scinded.
Fortunately, there is an approach open to states who desire to util-
ize a toll strategy on roads or bridges constructed or repaired with
150. Friends of the Earth v. Carey, 535 F.2d at 177 n.18.
151. Letter to Peter R. Taft, Assistant Attorney General, Land & Natural Re-
sources Division, U.S. Dept. of Justice from John Hart Eby, General Counsel, U.S.
Dept. of Trans. (June 26, 1976).
152. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7401-7642 (1977 Pamphlet).
153. Id. at § 7410(c)(5)(A).
154. 23 U.S.C. § 301.
155. See Williams v. Riley, 280 U.S. 78, 80 (1929). (although California exacted
tolls for the use of its highways built with federal funds, by imposition of a tax, the
Court refused to review or annul the acts of the state legislature. Conflict alone, with-
out a showing of direct injury does not provide sufficient basis for review); Sanger v.
Lukens, 24 F.2d 226, 229 (S.D. Idaho 1927) (Federal Highway Act does not prohibit
states from regulating highways through privilege taxes or license fees since they are
not classified as tolls); County of Los Angeles v. Southern Cal. Gas Co., 184 Cal. App.
2d 169, 180-81 Cal. Rptr. 471, 478-79 (1960) (county is not prohibited by 23 U.S.C.
§ 301 from requiring utilities to pay rent for use of bridges built with federal funds
where the rent is for use of bridge as support to pipelines).
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federal highway funds. Administrative precedent exists for the re-
payment, with congressional approval, of all federal money in order
to escape the toll prohibition, in effect "buying out" the federal gov-
ernment to get a potentially large long-term return. One case, re-
ferred to the Comptroller General for interpretation, decided that no
legal authority exists for the refund or transfer of federal-aid highway
funds unless Congress authorizes repayment. 56 A number of states
have taken advantage of the congressionally approved payback ap-
proach, placing tolls on roads wholly within their boundaries.' 57
During the pendency of the New York litigation, the Department
of Transportation responded to an inquiry of the Justice Department
by issuing a slightly modified interpretation of the section 301 prohi-
bition. In the letter referred to in the court's decision, the General
Counsel stated that it would not be a violation of section 301 for the
State of New York to repay the federal funds invested in the
bridges.'58 This interpretation differs from the earlier Comptroller
General's opinion 59 in its conclusion that congressional approval of
the payback is not required where the federal contribution constitutes
only a small portion of the total construction cost of the facility,160
the proposed toll charges are intended for traffic control rather than
financing, and the proposed toll is part of an implementation strategy
under the Clean Air Act.
As a followup to the litigation, the Regional Administrator advised
New York that FHWA interpreted the court's opinion as holding that
there was no prohibition to establishing tolls on the bridges as long as
156. See 38 Comp. Gen. 266, 267-68 (1958). The New Jersey Turnpike authority,
which charges tolls refunded federal-aid funds for use on another toll-free route. Pub.
L. No. 81-646, 64 Stat. 403 (1950).
157. E.g., New Jersey-Garden State Pkwy., Pub. L. No. 90-495 § 20(a), 82 Stat.
825 (1968); Delaware and Maryland-Interstate 95, Pub. L. No. 86-657 § 6(a), 74 Stat.
522 (1960).
158. Letter to Peter R. Taft, Assistant Attorney General, Land and Natural Re-
sources Division, U.S. Dept. of Justice from John Hart Ely, General Counsel, U.S.
Dept. of Transportation (June 26, 1976).
159. 38 Comp. Gen. 266 (1958). See discussion at note 153 supra.
160. In the New York situation, it was determined that "small" federal contribu-
tions were made to three of the four bridges in question: the Manhattan, Washington
and Williamsburg. The amounts contributed ranged from $721,360 to $1,369,600.
The fourth bridge, the Alexander Hamilton, had received what the General Counsel
considered a "large" contribution of $27,013,773. By including size of the federal
contribution as a factor, the General Counsel failed to deal with the difficult problem
of line drawing to be determined on a case by case basis as a question of fact.
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the General Counsel's conditions were met."'6 FHWA's present posi-
tion is clear: Section 301 applies unless the three conditions in the
General Counsel's memorandum are met. If the conditions are not
met and a state nevertheless decides to impose tolls on federally-
aided facilities, the Administrator will take action to set aside the toll
imposition.
CONCLUSION
The Administrator's decisions in the most recent toll bridge cases,
and the position taken by the Department of Transportation during
the apparent conflict between the free-road provision of the Federal-
Aid Highway Act and the toll imposition strategy of the Clean Air
Act, evidence a policy in favor of mass transit support. Subsidization
of mass transit will be a major factor when the Administrator weighs
the reasonableness of future toll increases under the General Bridge
Acts. It will be considered as part of the base in determining the
reasonable rate of return, and independently in determining whether
the toll increase promotes the public interest. The Department's pol-
icy on payback without congressional approval to free facilities from
"non-profit" restrictions when the payback furthers a viable goal
under the Clean Air Act shows a much broader statutory construc-
tion of the toll prohibition.
As a result of the DRPA and Automobile Club of New York deci-
sions there is now a well-established set of criteria for determining
the reasonableness of toll rates. Both public and private bridge own-
ers may include in their considerations to increase toll rates all of the
factors which may later be examined by the Administrator. Addi-
tionally, states now have clear guidelines from the Administrator for
utilizing road and bridge tolls to achieve air quality goals. The devel-
opment of these criteria gives planners extremely useful tools to use
in structuring the financial support for mass transit systems and in
solving one urban environmental problem.
161. Memorandum from William M. Cox, Federal Highway Administrator for
Region One to Robert E. Kirby (April 18, 1977).
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